My current research is primarily in epistemology, but I also work in metaphysics and ethics. My dissertation focused on issues pertaining to intuitive justification: the nature of intuitive states, the epistemology of intuition, and several dangling issues concerning inferential justification turned up in my investigation into the epistemology of intuition.
For more information about me see my personal website.
1. “Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism About Intuition,” Philosophical Studies, 2013
2. “Ordinary Objects and Series-Style Answers to the Special Composition Question,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2013
3. “How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2013
4. “On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs,” Erkenntnis, forthcoming
5. “The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming
6. “Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming
Work In Progress
1. “Why Worry About Epistemic Circularity,” (w/ M.P. Lynch)
2. “The Norms of Assertion”
3. “Yet More Transmission Failure”
4. “Subjective Reasons and Epistemic Disagreement”