Should Human Beings Have Sex? Sexual Dimorphism and Human Enhancement

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Abstract

Since the first sex reassignment operations were performed, individual sex has come to be, to some extent at least, a technological artefact. The existence of sperm sorting technology, and of prenatal determination of foetal sex via ultrasound along with the option of termination, means that we now have the power to choose the sex of our children. An influential contemporary line of thought about medical ethics suggests that we should use technology to serve the welfare of individuals and to remove limitations on the opportunities available to them. I argue that, if these are our goals, we may do well to move towards a “post sex” humanity. Until we have the technology to produce genuine hermaphrodites, the most efficient way to do this is to use sex selection technology to ensure that only girl children are born. There are significant restrictions on the opportunities available to men, around gestation, childbirth, and breast-feeding, which will be extremely difficult to overcome via social or technological mechanisms for the foreseeable future. Women also have longer life expectancies than men. Girl babies therefore have a significantly more “open” future than boy babies. Resisting the conclusion that we should ensure that all children are born the same sex will require insisting that sexual difference is natural to human beings and that we should not use technology to reshape humanity beyond certain natural limits. The real concern of my paper, then, is the moral significance of the idea of a normal human body in modern medicine.

Keywords

Sex; ethics; human enhancement; sex selection; PGD; intersex conditions
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INTRODUCTION

Until recently, we could more or less take it for granted that the human species was made up of men and women and that an individual’s sex is fixed by fate at conception. The existence of sperm sorting technology, preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), and of determination of foetal sex via ultrasound, means that we now have the power to choose the sex of our children. As I outline in Section I, an influential contemporary line of thought about medical ethics suggests that we should use medical technology to serve the welfare of individuals and to remove limitations on the opportunities available to them, without regard to whether, in doing so, we are involved in therapy or enhancement. In Section II, I argue that, if these are our goals, we may do well to move towards a ‘post sex’ humanity. Until we have the technology to produce hermaphrodites, the most efficient way to do this is to use sex selection technology to ensure that only girl children are born. There are significant restrictions on the opportunities available to men, around gestation, childbirth, and breast-feeding, which will be extremely difficult to overcome for the foreseeable future. Women also have longer life expectancies than men. Girl babies therefore have a significantly more open future than boy babies. In Section III of the paper, I survey various possible objections to sex selection in favour of girls and argue that none of them mitigate against the conclusion that parents are obligated to have girl babies. In Section IV, I argue that even in the absence of an obligation to choose the ‘best’ child, we cannot justify choosing male children without making reference to the idea of ‘normal human capacities’. Yet the idea that we are obligated to have only children of one sex is perilously close to a reductio ad absurdum of the argument for human enhancement. In Section V, therefore, I suggest that resisting the conclusion that we should ensure that all children are born the same sex will require insisting that sexual difference is natural to human beings and that we should not use technology to reshape humanity beyond certain natural limits. The ultimate concern of my paper, then, is the moral significance of the idea of a ‘normal human body’ in modern medicine.

I. BUILDING BETTER BABIES: THE CASE FOR ENHANCEMENT

The question of whether it is better to have sons rather than daughters appears at first atavistic; a depressing reminder of a sexism that we might hope that we had left behind. However, I want to argue that an important current in contemporary bioethical thought compels us to reconsider it.

1 Since the early nineteen fifties, however, when the first sex change operations were performed, individual sex has come to be, to some extent at least, a technological artefact (Meyerowitz 2002). For the small fraction of individuals born ‘intersex’, sex has always been a socially constructed imperative (Fausto-Sterling 2000).
As our power to modify the capacities of human bodies through medical (and other) technologies has grown ever greater, so too has the controversy about how we should use this power and whether we should recognise any natural limits in doing so. In particular, a wide range of applications of medical technology now seem to involve more than just restoring sick bodies to their natural health and instead involve enhancing the capacities of already healthy individuals (The President’s Council on Bioethics 2003; Roco and Bainbridge 2002). Anabolic steroids, cosmetic surgery, oral contraception, vaccination, and human growth hormone are all innovations that have been used to try to make individuals ‘better than well’ (Elliott 2003). Perhaps more importantly, technologies of prenatal diagnosis and, in particular, PGD, combined with our ever-increasing knowledge of human genetics, allow prospective parents to select in favour of children with desired traits as well and as much as against children with undesired traits (Kitcher 1996).

In the context of debates about the ethics of enhancement, a number of authors now argue that the capacities of a ‘normal’ human body provide us with little guidance about the capacities that people should have in the future (Glover 2006; Harris 2007; Savulescu 2001; Agar 2004; Silver 1999; Stock 2003; Green 2007). The arguments that speak in favour of applying medical technology to eliminate ill-health also speak in favour of using it to enhance the capacities of human beings (Harris 1993). There seems to be no reason why the meliorist ambitions of medicine should end at what is currently considered to be normal. Indeed, the ‘normal’ – at least in the sense of average – capacities of the human body today are already partially the product of existing technologies, such as vaccination, clothing, footwear, dental care, and diet, which further weakens the intuition that what is currently considered to be normal should serve as a limit to restrict the applications of new technologies (Harris 2007; Agar 2004). Instead of being concerned to achieve the normal, we should simply use medical (and other) technologies to improve the lives of human beings. Eventually, this will mean bringing children into the world with capacities above the current ‘norm’.

Importantly, the idea that parents should act so as to improve the life prospects of their children is already internal to our conception of what being a good parent consists in (Harris 2007; Savulescu 2001). Parents often take special care to educate their children, buy them piano lessons, or nurture their talents in any area in which they excel. When they do so, we do not criticise them for trying to ‘enhance’ their children but instead praise them for their concern for their child’s future well-being (Agar 2004; Buchanan et al. 2000, 156–159). Yet where such efforts are successful they succeed in shaping the character (phenotype) of the child. It is difficult to explain why genetic interventions should be prohibited where environmental interventions are not, given that they have the same result (Harris 2007, 2–3).

These arguments have been taken by a number of authors to suggest that we have good reason to – and perhaps are even obliged to – have the best child possible (Savulescu 2001; Savulescu 2006; Savulescu 2005; Harris 2007; Chan and Harris 2007). We should make use of existing and future technologies to try to maximise the welfare and/or opportunities available to our children. For various reasons, set out elsewhere, I believe the claim that we have an obligation to maximise the future life prospects of children to be implausibly strong (Sparrow 2007; Buchanan et al. 2000, 161–162; Glover 2006, 54). However, for the purposes of the argument in Sections I–III, I am going to make use of the claim that we have good reasons to try to produce ‘the best child possible’ in order to explore the consequences of the claim that the idea of a normal human body has little role to play when it comes to choices about the capacities of future children. In Section IV, I turn to discuss the implications of my argument for weaker claims about how we should make decisions about the application of medical technologies in the absence of a normatively significant account of normal human capacities.
II. SEX SELECTION AND ENHANCEMENT

If we do have reason to have the best children possible, then we cannot avoid the question of whether a male or a female child will have a better chance in life. Considered over the whole of a human life, the sex of the child will exercise a much larger influence on its welfare, and on the opportunities available to it, than many of the other genetic variations that medicine currently concerns itself with. The impact of the child’s sex on its future well-being are also well understood and reasonably predictable, at least in comparison to many other forms of genetic variation. This means that the question of which sex is better should be more tractable than many other possible decisions about the genetics of future children.

Why girls are better than boys

The ethical debate about sex selection has, almost without exception, assumed that the central question is whether parents should be permitted to choose male children. In part this has been because selection in favour of males and against females has been the predominant use of various technologies of sex selection where they have been widely adopted, as, for instance, in India and China. However, it has also been because the existence of widespread and profound institutional sexism in most societies across the world means that male children appear likely to have better life prospects and a much wider range of opportunities than female children.

Of course, whether or not we should take existing social prejudices into account when thinking about children’s life prospects is controversial. One obvious reason to be cautious about doing so is that it seems likely to exacerbate such prejudices. Some authors have therefore suggested that we are obligated to discount the effects of prejudice when making judgements about the relative opportunities of different sorts of children; the proper response to the existence of such prejudice is to strive to overcome it via social and political campaigns rather than to reinforce it by means of eugenic interventions (Agar 2004, 151–152; Buchanan et al. 2000, 283–284; Kitcher 1996, 217–218).

In fact, it is difficult for any philosophy that accepts that parents have reasons to be concerned for the prospects of their children to justify discounting those reasons when the source of reduced prospects is bigotry. It is hard to see why the child should suffer because of the existence of another injustice and their parents’ desire not to be complicit with it (Agar 2004, 155–156). The distinction between reduced opportunities due to social causes and reduced opportunities due to biological causes also requires that we can identify a set of normal human capacities that can be determined independently of social (and technological) context – precisely the idea that advocates for human enhancement reject at the very beginning the argument for non-therapeutic use of medical technology (Bostrom and Roache 2008). Strictly speaking, if our only concern is the prospects of child then we should take prevailing environmental conditions into account as much as the child’s future genetics and regardless of whether they are social or ‘natural’. Depending on one’s other philosophical and political commitments, this may count as an argument against an obligation to
maximise life prospects or an argument in favour of fitting children to the prevailing social conditions.\(^2\)

Regardless of our conclusions about whether we should allow the prejudice of others to influence our decisions about the life prospects of children, I believe that there are independent grounds to hold that philosophers (and parents) are mistaken in thinking that male children will always have superior life prospects. There are four arguments which together suggest that, in fact, in some societies it is now – or soon will be – better to be born a woman.\(^3\)

First, while sexism remains pervasive, it is also true that in most, if not all, societies the extent of this sexism is being reduced. Moreover, there is some reason to hope that this trend will continue. In the not-too-distant future – hopefully – social prejudice will not prevent women having equal opportunities with men.

Second, once a basic level of health care during childbirth can be assumed, women have significantly longer life expectancies than men.\(^4\) This means that girl children have a more ‘open future’ than male children, being able to pursue more projects, and also longer term projects, over the course of their lives. Depending on how we evaluate welfare, it may also mean that female children have higher expected welfare over the course of their lives.\(^5\)

Third, there are also a number of experiences around pregnancy, childbirth, and child-rearing that are widely believed to be some of the most meaningful and important experiences possible in a human life, which are available to women and unavailable to men (Brock 1994; Robertson 1994). If we include these experiences in the list of possible human experiences that we use to compare the relative ‘openness’ of futures then it is clear that girl children have significantly more open futures than male children; there are opportunities available to them that are not available to male children. The existence of these opportunities also has implications for the expected welfare of girl children. Should they want to become pregnant, give birth, or breast-feed children, they will be able to satisfy these desires; should they not desire these experiences, they are no worse off. Male children who grow up wanting to become pregnant, to give birth, or to experience the close emotional

\(^2\) For the first of these interpretations, see Sparrow 2007, for the second, see Savulescu 2001. If parents do have an obligation to take social circumstances into account when choosing the best possible child, this will not open up space for choosing children of either sex: it may establish an obligation to have male children who will benefit from the existence of institutional sexism.

\(^3\) There is, inevitably, a certain difficulty in understanding such ‘cross life’ comparisons, which raise the ‘non-identity problem’ (Parfit 1984; Brock 1995). It is not my goal here to settle the dispute about how to best interpret such claims or, indeed, whether they are possible. The argument that we are obligated to choose the best child possible presumes that such comparisons are coherent and morally significant, as indeed does any argument that we have obligations (beyond avoiding bringing into existence persons who would prefer to be dead) relating to what sort of children we should bring into the world. Later in the paper I will discuss an example which avoids the philosophical difficulties associated with the non-identity problem.

\(^4\) In the industrialised world, women live on average roughly 3 to 7 years longer than men, with a ‘health adjusted life expectancy’ of 2-4 years greater than men (World Health Organisation 2009, Table 1). If the difference in male and female life expectancies is a result of social circumstances in sexist societies then this reason lapses. However, it seems likely that at least some of this difference in life-expectancy reflects differences in male and female biology that will be expressed across a wide range of environments (Institute of Medicine Committee on Understanding the Biology of Sex and Gender Differences 2001).

\(^5\) The caveat here relates to the question as to whether we should be concerned with total welfare over a lifetime or with the average welfare per day (or some other unit of time). A longer life will likely produce a greater total welfare over the course of that life; it may or may not produce a greater average welfare. For a recent discussion of the relationship between longevity and welfare, see Walker 2007.
relationship with a child that breast-feeding makes possible, on the other hand, will be bitterly disappointed and substantially worse off.

Fourth, in comparison there are few, if any, experiences that are available to men that are not, in principle, available to women. There are a number of experiences around the sex act which are reserved for men but these are paralleled by similar experiences available to women and not to men. Apart from these, restrictions on the opportunities available to women are almost entirely the result of social discrimination or are easily overcome with existing technology. The ‘natural advantage’ of males, which is most often mentioned in conversations about differences between the sexes, that they are ‘stronger’, is irrelevant in any society which has mastered the technology of the block and tackle. It would require an extremely sophisticated technology, on the other hand, to overcome the limitations on the opportunities available to men to gestate or lactate.

Taken together, these considerations amount to a compelling case that it is better to be born a woman than a man in any society where the effects of institutional sexism have been sufficiently ameliorated. The biological advantages of being born a woman are so extensive that, even in societies where some sexism persists, women may have significantly more open futures than men. Given that the effects of institutional sexism are declining, at some stage there will be a point in time beyond which children born female will have better life prospects. Indeed we may already have reached that point today. If we have reason to have the ‘best baby’ then we have reason to have a girl baby!

Ultimately, of course, there is no reason to believe that the best baby will be either male or female as we now understand them. A better baby yet would have the capacities of both sexes, the physical strength of men and the life expectancy and reproductive capacities of women. In order to avoid restrictions on the opportunities available to future children the important human experiences around reproduction should be available to all persons. That is to say, human beings should be hermaphroditic.

Choosing embryos

To illustrate the claim that girl babies are better than boys and to investigate its implications, it will be useful to imagine the following hypothetical scenario:

An anxious couple, prospective parents, who have been counselled that their child is likely to be at risk of a genetic disorder with not-too-dramatic – but nonetheless significant – consequences for any child that suffers it, have chosen to conceive multiple embryos using in vitro fertilisation and screen them for the condition using PGD. When they meet with their genetic counsellor to be informed of the results, they are told that they have produced two viable embryos that can be expected to be free of the disease condition. However, the counsellor also informs them that in the course of testing the diagnosing technician also became aware of other information relevant to the future life prospects of these embryos, which the medical team feels that the parents should be aware of. One of the embryos (Embryo ‘B’) suffers from a genetic condition that significantly reduces – by some five years – the life expectancy of those who are born with it. Moreover, this condition is associated with serious ‘reproductive difficulties’. In comparison, the other embryo (Embryo ‘A’) will produce a child with a longer life expectancy who can be more confident of enjoying the pleasures of parenthood.

The parents ask for more information about these ‘reproductive difficulties’ and are told that, while they are ‘poorly understood’, persons experiencing the reproductive
difficulties associated with the condition often have difficulty forming close emotional bonds with their children, especially during the first two years, and are sometimes entirely unable to satisfy their desire to reproduce. However, they are reassured, most people who are born with this condition learn to live with it – and many never acknowledge any distress associated with it.

The question the parents now face is: which embryo would they like to have implanted?

If this is all the information available to the parents then it seems as though they have good reason to choose Embryo A over Embryo B. Indeed, it seems that they would need to provide some justification for choosing Embryo B.

Of course, the ‘genetic condition’ in this scenario is ‘maleness’ and it seems as though the parents have good reason to choose the female child. As I will discuss further below, the intuition – if we have one at all – that it is permissible to choose Embryo B relies on the assumption that maleness is not a deficit and is, indeed, instead part of normal human variation. That is to say, it relies on the intuition that both male and female embryos are ‘normal’. However, the idea that the normal capacities of human beings should be normatively significant in this way is precisely what is under threat in much contemporary bioethics.

III. RESPONSES TO OBJECTIONS

In this section I address a number of possible objections to the idea that we have an obligation to select girl children and argue that – in the absence of a normatively significant notion of normal human capacities – none of them ultimately succeed in showing that we do not have such an obligation.

Do human beings need sex?

It might be objected that the birth only of girl children would be a disaster for humanity by threatening the reproduction of the species. Until reproductive technologies become very advanced, both male and female gametes will be necessary to produce children, which means that there will need to be some men available.

A concern for the fate of the species often comes up in naive conversations about reproductive technology but it is simply unclear as to why parents should be concerned with anything more than the life prospects of their particular children. What, after all, is the fate of the species to any of us? Moreover, references to the needs of the ‘species’ should be especially controversial in the context of the contemporary debate about human enhancement, wherein advocates of enhancement typically take pains to distinguish their own concern for the welfare of individuals from the ‘old’ eugenic concern with the fate of the ‘race’ or ‘species’ (Agar 2004, 3-16; Glover 2006, 26-29; Green 2007, 7; Savulescu 2001, 424).

In any case, the survival of the species would be easily ensured even in a world in which only women were born as long as a sufficient supply of frozen sperm had been laid in stock to last until the technology to produce sperm from the somatic cells of women became available. Moreover, of course, in reality it is highly unlikely that any attempt to improve human beings by selection or genetic manipulation could jeopardise the survival of the species, simply because it is unlikely that
any such interventions would be undertaken universally.

A more serious version of this objection focuses on the possibility that, if responsible parents chose female children, a severe gender imbalance may eventually develop, rendering it difficult for heterosexual women to find a mate. Again, as long as frozen sperm (or other more esoteric reproductive technologies) were available, the absence of a mate need not threaten an individual woman’s opportunity to reproduce. However, it might jeopardise her happiness in so far as this is linked to various psychological dispositions which produce the desire to enjoy the company of the opposite sex.

One important observation in this context is that while prospective parents might prefer that the next generation include a large number of men it may nevertheless be the case that each couple should choose a girl child. There is a collective action problem here. The public good of sexual diversity may be threatened by the private pursuit of sex-related advantage, for our offspring.

In the short term, at least, the existence of this collective action problem explains why it would be bad policy to insist that everyone should have girl children or to publicise the reasons why they should. It might even be bad public policy to allow people to choose the sex of their children. Collectively, the actions of parents who try to advantage their children by having daughters are likely to be self-defeating.

However, my interest is in the logic of the argument that establishes the imperative to choose a girl child rather than in the policy we should adopt in response to this argument. The existence of a collective action problem does not alter the fact that when it comes to the decision as to what sort of child to have, each couple has compelling reasons to choose a girl.

In the longer term, there is a simple ‘engineering’ solution to the collective action problem, which is to sever the link between happiness and desire for the company of persons of the opposite sex. If geneticists succeed in finding a ‘gene’ or – more realistically – a set of genes that predispose individuals towards same-sex attractions then the best baby is presumably one that is likely to grow up to be a lesbian. Alternatively, if we think of the objects of our sexual attraction as a matter of choice or as a product of our environment, girl children could simply be encouraged, or educated, to prefer the company of women. Parents who chose babies who will grow up to be lesbians need not fear that their children will suffer if other couples make the same choice. The ultimate solution to this ‘problem’, however, is to engineer entirely hermaphrodite human beings. If all persons were one sex, equally capable of reproducing with – and being attracted to – all other people, this would eliminate the need for some parents to choose less-than-optimal children for the sake of the common good.

Is sex good?

Flirtation, romance, love, fornication, and orgasm are all arguably good things. There are undoubtedly some people who believe that these goods will only be available in a world in which there are two sexes. This is clearly false – all of these goods are realisable in a world in which there are only homosexual women or in a world consisting entirely of appropriately designed hermaphrodites. Nonetheless, it might be argued that the existence of two sexes increases the variety of human experience and is a condition for the production of various goods arising out of interaction between the two sexes (Scruton 2006).

Yet, once more, there is a collective action problem here. The existence of sexual diversity may be required to produce certain important goods, but no particular parent is required to choose a child of
any particular sex in order to produce these goods. Given that girls have more open futures than boys, each couple has reason to choose a girl and no couple has reason to choose a boy. Without some sort of collective action to prevent parents pursuing what is best for their children, the good of diversity will not be maintained. Indeed, it appears that sexual diversity can only be achieved at the expense of the interests of those parents who are required to have sons in order to produce it. This also raises the question of the justification of requiring that some persons have reduced opportunities and lower well-being in order to produce goods that will largely be enjoyed by others. In particular, there is a danger that this involves using some people for the benefit of others.6

Two sexes good, three sexes better?

A further difficulty with the argument that the existence of two sexes is required to produce certain goods is that it is there is no a priori reason to believe that the best way to produce the postulated benefits of sexual diversity is to stop at two sexes. If ‘variety is the spice of life’ then perhaps we would do better with more sexual variation (Fausto-Sterling 2000, 78–114). Why not engineer human beings so that they are divided into three sexes or four sexes or even more? This would make possible a still-wider range of romantic and social relationships, and of sexual experiences. Defenders of the status quo owe us an argument to explain why two sexes will produce most human happiness.

This observation is indicative of a more general problem with ‘Panglossian’ arguments, which hold that features of the current human condition such as diversity, or suffering, or contingency, etc, are necessary to the production of important goods, which is that they typically neglect the possibility that more of these phenomena might be brought about in order to produce more of the postulated goods (Sandel 2007; McKibben 2003; Kass 2002, 267–268; Parens 1995). Once we recognise that we might use our increasing control over the circumstances of human life to produce more rather than less – as is usually proposed – of the contested features of the current situation, the status quo is revealed as doubly arbitrary. Moreover, the fact that critics of the use of medical (and other) technologies to reduce contingency, suffering, or diversity, etc, seldom argue that we should instead use these technologies to increase or sustain these phenomena suggests that their defence of the status quo is essentially conservative rather than motivated by a genuine concern for the goods they postulate.

One sex for all?

Notice also that any society that contains two or more sexes and in which sexual orientation is largely fixed, more or less guarantees that a significant percentage of potential life partners will be unavailable to any given individual. There will be many occasions in which we meet our ‘soul mate’ – or just someone with whom we might expect to be able to have a pleasurable sexual encounter – only to discover that they are not of the appropriate sex. Missed opportunities and frequent disappointment are also an inevitable consequence of sexual difference.

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6 This possibility looms especially large where the diversity in question is diversity in the human form as conceived in debates around disability. It is one thing to argue that the presence of people with disabilities in the community makes possible certain goods, it is quite another to argue that parents should be required to bring children with disabilities into the world in order to produce these goods.